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A B S T R ACT. Sir Horace Wilson was Neville Chamberlain’s conﬁdential adviser while the latter was
prime minister. The article addresses three questions. First, what was Wilson’s role in Whitehall in
connection with rearmament and foreign policy ? Second, did he diminish the inﬂuence of the Foreign Oﬃce?
Third, what contribution does his defence of appeasement make to understanding of a subject that continues
to divide historians? The article concludes that Wilson played an important role in enabling Chamberlain to
pursue his foreign policy goals. However, when there was outright disagreement between Wilson and the
Foreign Oﬃce, it was the Foreign Oﬃce view that prevailed. Finally, the evidence of Wilson’s words and
actions, both in 1937–9 and later, broadly supports R. A. C. Parker’s post-revisionist interpretation of
appeasement, particularly as regards Munich, but Wilson was a good deal ﬁrmer in 1939 about Britain’s
will to ﬁght, if necessary, than his critics then or later allowed.
No history of British appeasement is complete without some reference to Sir
Horace Wilson’s role as Neville Chamberlain’s conﬁdential adviser, and in
particular to Wilson’s meetings with Hitler as the prime minister’s emissary im-
mediately prior to the Munich conference in September 1938. Yet there has been
no serious study of Wilson himself in relation to appeasement since Martin
Gilbert published a short article in History Today in 1982.1 To date, archival work
on Wilson’s career has been conﬁned to his years at the Ministry of Labour and
the Board of Trade.2 This neglect would have surprised Wilson’s contemporaries.
In the spring of 1939 Wilson was appointed permanent secretary of the Treasury
and head of the Civil Service, regarded by one Labour critic as a more powerful
position than that held by ‘almost anybody since Cardinal Wolsey ’.3 Wilson’s rise
was remarkable for someone from a modest social background who had entered
the Civil Service as a boy clerk and whose university degree was a B.Sc. (Econ)
taken by part-time study at the London School of Economics. R. A. Butler, who
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as parliamentary under-secretary of state at the Foreign Oﬃce knew Wilson well,
described him in the summer of 1939 as ‘ the Burleigh of the present age ’.4 Unlike
Burleigh, who was able to win the conﬁdence of two very diﬀerent Tudor queens,
Mary and Elizabeth, Wilson was regarded by Chamberlain’s successor, Winston
Churchill, as an appeaser who should be excluded from inﬂuence on foreign
policy. Churchill had no diﬃculty in accepting the Labour party’s demand that
Wilson should be removed from 10 Downing Street as a condition of forming a
coalition government in May 1940. Indeed, he considered sacking Wilson, but
was persuaded by Kingsley Wood, the chancellor of the exchequer, that such an
action would be contrary to the convention that ministers, not civil servants, were
responsible for policy, and Wilson was allowed to remain at the Treasury until he
reached the normal age of retirement in 1942.5
According to the left-wing journalists who wrote the polemic, Guilty men (1940),
Wilson established an ascendancy over Chamberlain that would take its place in
history, providing the policy, philosophy, and ideology that dominated the prime
minister’s mind. What the philosophy or ideology might be was not made explicit,
although there was a reference to Wilson’s adherence to the doctrines of Dr Frank
Buchman, whose followers exchanged religious experiences and sought divine
guidance.6 Since Chamberlain never developed any religious faith, Buchmanism
seems an improbable link between the two men. Lord Gladwyn, who as Gladwyn
Jebb was a Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcial in the 1930s, thought that the theories shared by
Chamberlain and Wilson on how best to deal with dictators originated in the
prime minister’s mind.7 In practice it is diﬃcult to be sure whether ideas originate
with a minister or a civil servant, since even a memorandum by the civil servant
may reﬂect an earlier conversation with the minister. The diﬃculty is all the
greater when, as Chamberlain’s biographer, Robert Self, notes, the minister and
civil servant ‘enjoyed the sort of unparalleled intimacy only possible among truly
kindred spirits ’.8 David Dutton believes that Wilson was little more than a loyal
and eﬃcient civil servant carrying out the prime minister’s instructions, whereas
David Reynolds thinks Wilson’s role in the negotiations with Hitler in September
1938 shows that he was more than that.9 Alastair Parker thought that the fact that
Wilson was able to approve Foreign Oﬃce instructions to an ambassador without
4 R. A. Butler papers, RAB F80, fo. 102, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge.
5 Kingsley Wood to Churchill, 27 July 1941, Sir Winston Churchill papers, CHAR 20/20, Churchill
Archives Centre, Cambridge. Wilson believed that he was unpopular with Labour on account of the
role he had played in defeating the General Strike in 1926, his opposition to the repeal of the sub-
sequent Trades Disputes Act, and his friendship with the industrialist Lord Weir who advised the
government on rearmament – ‘Talk with Horace Wilson’, 16 July 1942, Thomas Jones CH class P
papers, vol. 3, fo. 68, National Library of Wales.
6 ‘Cato’ [Michael Foot, Peter Howard, and Frank Owen], Guilty men (London, 1940), pp. 86, 89.
7 Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 76. As Gladwyn Jebb he was private secretary to
Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent under-secretary.
8 R. Self, Neville Chamberlain, a biography (Aldershot, 2006), p. 446.
9 D. Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London, 2001), p. 203; D. Reynolds, Summits : six meetings that shaped
the twentieth century (London, 2007), p. 417.
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referring them ﬁrst to Chamberlain suggested that Wilson’s inﬂuence was greater
than he admitted. However, a prime minister would be overwhelmed if his oﬃ-
cials did not give him some protection from paperwork. In the case mentioned by
Parker, Wilson knew Chamberlain’s thinking well enough to be able to expedite
matters by anticipating the prime minister’s approval, which was given subse-
quently by telephone.10 Gladwyn’s characterization of Wilson as an e´minence grise,
with that term’s overtones of Cardinal Richelieu’s control of French foreign
policy in the reign of Louis XIII, would only be appropriate if it could be shown
that Wilson took policy decisions or that Chamberlain invariably followed his
advice.11
The evidence of how Wilson operated in Whitehall and his part in developing
the policy of appeasement is incomplete. He kept no diary or private notes while
he was a civil servant, and wrote no memoirs. However, the ﬁles of the Prime
Minister’s Oﬃce provide evidence of the nature of his work there.12 Some of
Wilson’s papers relating to Munich were preserved in the Cabinet Oﬃce and
some in the Treasury.13 Wilson’s correspondence can be found in the papers of
other people, and he allowed a number of historians to interview him. It is thus
possible to address three questions. First, what was Wilson’s role in Whitehall in
the years when Chamberlain was prime minister? Second, what part did Wilson
play in foreign policy, and in particular, did he diminish the inﬂuence of the
Foreign Oﬃce? Third, what contribution does his defence of appeasement make
to an understanding of a subject that continues to divide historians?
I
Historians are not always clear as to Wilson’s position in Whitehall in the later
1930s. For example, Gilbert describes him as being ‘at the Treasury’ when
Chamberlain became prime minister on 28 May 1937.14 However, although
Wilson’s salary was paid through the Treasury vote, he was not a member of the
chancellor of the exchequer’s department. Wilson had ﬁrst made his mark as
permanent secretary of the Ministry of Labour in the 1920s. In 1930 he was given
the title of chief industrial adviser to HMGovernment, with an oﬃce at the Board
of Trade. However, when Stanley Baldwin became prime minister for the third
10 R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and appeasement (Basingstoke, 1993), p. 258.
11 Gladwyn,Memoirs, p. 76. Historians using the same term include R. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and
appeasement (London, 2000), p. 81; Self, Neville Chamberlain, p. 292, and D. R. Thorpe, Eden (London,
2004), p. 186.
12 Prime Minister’s Oﬃce papers (PREM), series 1, The National Archives of the United Kingdom
(TNA).
13 Lord Bridges’s papers contain some of Wilson’s papers which were presumably inherited by
Bridges when he became permanent secretary of the Treasury and head of the Civil Service in
1945 – see Treasury papers (T), series 273, TNA.
14 Gilbert, ‘Horace Wilson’, p. 4. Ian Colvin, Vansittart in oﬃce (London, 1965), p. 137, also locates
Wilson in the Treasury before 1939. J. Charmley, Chamberlain and the lost peace (London, 1989), p. 85,
gives Wilson’s position in 1938 prematurely as ‘Head of the Civil Service’.
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time in 1935, in his 68th year, he felt that he needed more support than that
provided by the normal staﬀ in the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, and Wilson went to
10 Downing Street as his personal adviser. Wilson retained his title of chief in-
dustrial adviser and he expected to return to the Board of Trade when Baldwin
retired. In the event, Chamberlain kept him in the same wide-ranging role as he
had had with Baldwin, but with an increased emphasis on foreign policy, re-
ﬂecting the new prime minister’s interests.
According to Wilson, he ﬁrst met Chamberlain in 1923, when the latter was
chancellor of the exchequer, and saw him frequently while he was at the Ministry
of Health (1924–9) and after he returned to the Treasury in 1931, and also when
both men were at the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in 1932, when
Wilson was the most senior oﬃcial accompanying the British delegation.15 It has
been suggested that Chamberlain came to rely on Wilson while at the Treasury,
but the evidence of the Treasury ﬁles leaves no doubt that Chamberlain’s prin-
cipal adviser while he was chancellor was Sir Warren Fisher, permanent secretary
of the Treasury and head of the Civil Service from 1919 to 1939. However, al-
though Fisher had been an adviser to a number of prime ministers, his inﬂuence
rapidly waned once Chamberlain moved to 10 Downing Street.16
Accounts of contemporaries leave no doubt of the closeness of Chamberlain
and Wilson, but there are diﬀerences regarding the nature of the relationship. To
Sir John Colville, who became Chamberlain’s private secretary in October 1939,
Wilson was the prime minister’s alter ego, in that Chamberlain rarely acted without
his advice, and Wilson had come to believe himself as infallible as the prime
minister thought him to be. Lord Woolton, who became minister for food ﬁve
weeks before Chamberlain resigned in May 1940, wrote that Wilson’s power was
unequalled by any member of the cabinet except the prime minister, who valued
Wilson’s ability to cope with the perpetual ﬂow of papers, his detailed knowledge
of what was happening in Whitehall, and the fact that he was someone with
whom Chamberlain could talk and upon whom he could rely. On the other hand,
Chamberlain’s sister Hilda said that he used Wilson simply as a messenger who
knew his mind.17 By Wilson’s own account, he saw all the papers in the Prime
Minister’s Oﬃce and might put a note on some of them, or dictate a note on what
he had been told, but he did not exercise power ; he was, he said, merely a kind of
additional member of the secretarial staﬀ. He thought he was a comfort to
Chamberlain, who did not make friends easily, and he acted as a sort of ‘chop-
ping block’ for the prime minister’s ideas.18 The evidence suggests that Hilda
Chamberlain’s comment may be accurate as regards Wilson’s mission to
15 Addison’s notes of talk with Wilson, 4 Apr. 1967.
16 Reynolds, Summits, p. 46; E. O’Halpin, Head of the Civil Service (London, 1989), pp. 63–4, 219–21.
17 J. Colville, The fringes of power : Downing Street diary, 1939–1955 (London, 1985), p. 36; Lord Woolton,
Memoirs (London, 1959), p. 140; notes on conversation with Hilda Chamberlain, 29 Nov. 1951,
Viscount Templewood papers, part XIX, ﬁle 5, Cambridge University Library.
18 Addison’s notes of talk with Wilson, 4 Apr. 1967.
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Germany in September 1938, but that both she and Wilson understated his role
as Chamberlain’s adviser.
The papers of the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce show that Wilson’s activities were
many and various. In the civil sphere they ranged from commenting on the
reorganization of the electricity industry to chairing an interdepartmental com-
mittee on the special areas of high unemployment. When Wilson took over as
permanent secretary of the Treasury and head of the Civil Service on 20 May
1939 he retained his oﬃce and role at 10 Downing Street in addition to his new
duties. The headship of the Civil Service involved responsibility for advising the
prime minister on all senior appointments, including those in the Foreign Oﬃce.
As permanent secretary of the Treasury, Wilson was also responsible for advising
on economic policy and chaired key interdepartmental committees. The Labour
party leader, Clement Attlee, commented that, while Chamberlain was prime
minister, Wilson ‘had a hand in everything, ran everything’.19
Wilson told Paul Addison that he had nothing to do with rearmament, but this
claim illustrates the perils of oral history.20 While it appears to be true that Wilson,
as he said, was never in touch with the chiefs of staﬀ of the armed forces, he was
much concerned with industrial aspects of rearmament. On 17 October 1935 he
was present when Chamberlain assured a delegation from the Federation of
British Industries that the government had no wish to impose controls on business
and hoped that as far as possible industry would organize itself to prevent com-
petition for skilled labour.21 When the rearmament programme began in the
spring of 1936 Wilson became a member of the Principal Supply Oﬃcers
Committee, where representatives of the Admiralty, Air Ministry, War Oﬃce,
Board of Trade, Ministry of Labour, and Treasury met to co-ordinate the services’
industrial requirements. He also acted as an intermediary between Chamberlain
and both trade unionists and employers regarding ways to expedite production.
Given Chamberlain’s belief that defence and foreign policy had to be corre-
lated, since each inﬂuenced the other, it was inevitable that Wilson should be
drawn into questions of strategy.22 During 1937 it became increasingly apparent
that the rapidly growing rearmament programme was placing a strain on the
economy, and Sir Thomas Inskip, the minister for co-ordination of defence,
carried out a review of the defence departments’ programmes with a view to re-
establishing Treasury control of expenditure and allocating priorities. He was
advised by a panel of oﬃcials, of whom Wilson was one. Wilson shared the
Treasury’s belief that Britain’s economic stability was a deterrent to aggression by
the dictator states, but his advice was not wholly helpful to that department’s case.
The Treasury hoped to restrict the size of the armed forces to what could be paid
for out of current revenue once the period covered by the Defence Loans Act of
19 K. Harris, Attlee (London, 1982), p. 180. 20 Notes of talk with Wilson, 4 Apr. 1967.
21 R. Shay, British rearmament in the thirties (Princeton, NJ, 1977), pp. 95–7.
22 Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) minutes, 5 July 1937, Cabinet Oﬃce papers (CAB)
2/6, TNA.
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1937 had ended. Wilson questioned the Treasury’s estimates of the revenue
available to support the armed forces ﬁve years hence, and suggested that, if the
priority for defence in 1942 required it, economies could be made elsewhere in the
chancellor’s budget.23 This advice made it easier for Inskip to recommend in
February 1938 that defence expenditure should rise in 1938 and 1939, as far as was
possible without imposing controls on industry and labour, with a further review
in 1939 in the light of the international situation.24
According to Eden’s parliamentary private secretary, J. P. L. Thomas, Wilson
was quite relaxed on the subject of rearmament about this time because he
thought that the appeasement of Germany and Italy was likely to lead to dis-
armament.25 Not everyone was relaxed, especially as the RAF was expanding
more slowly than the Luftwaﬀe. The Labour party wanted an independent inves-
tigation into the Air Ministry, and Wilson saw Attlee on Chamberlain’s behalf on
10 February 1938, when he argued that an investigation would hold up the work
of the Air Ministry. Attlee initially opted instead to raise questions in parlia-
ment.26 However, on 12 March the cabinet faced two problems: the threat to
Czechoslovakia following Hitler’s occupation of Austria, which had occurred that
day, and how to respond to Churchill’s intention to attack the inadequacy of the
RAF’s expansion programme and to support an Opposition motion for an in-
quiry into the Air Ministry. The problems were related because, as Inskip re-
marked two days later, in order to increase aircraft production it would be
necessary to approach the trade unions to ask for co-operation in accepting
changes in work practices, and he anticipated that they would make conditions :
‘ for example, they might demand that the government should undertake the use
of arms in support of Czechoslovakia, or insist on the question being dealt with by
the League of Nations ’.27 Wilson was asked to see Sir Walter Citrine, the general
secretary of the Trades Union Congress, whom he knew well. On 21 March
Wilson was able to report to Chamberlain that Citrine was in favour of the prime
minister seeing members of the TUC General Council to educate them in the
‘ international facts of life ’, and agreed that ways in which to accelerate rearma-
ment were best left to the employers and unions concerned. This view was en-
dorsed by the General Council after their meeting with Chamberlain and Inskip
on 23 March, and, following discussion with Citrine, Wilson briefed Chamberlain
before a further meeting on 26 May to allay trade unionists’ concerns about the
government’s foreign policy and the eﬀects of changes in industrial practices on
employment once rearmament was complete.28
23 Minutes of meeting of 12 Nov. 1937, CAB 64/30.
24 ‘Defence expenditure in future years : interim report ’, 15 Dec. 1937, CAB 24/273, and ‘Further
report ’, 8 Feb. 1938, CAB 24/274.
25 Memorandum by J. P. L. Thomas (Viscount Cilcennin), n.d. but prepared for Eden while latter
was writing his memoirs, Avon papers, AP 7/24/81, Special Collections, University of Birmingham.
26 Note by Wilson, 11 Feb. 1938, PREM 1/238, fos. 133–4.
27 Cabinet conclusions (CC) 12 (38) and 13 (38), 12 and 14 Mar., 1938, CAB 23/92.
28 PREM 1/251, fos. 20–5, 51–7, 88–9, 91–4, 101–6.
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Some aircraft ﬁrms blamed the Air Ministry for delays in production, and in
March 1938 Wilson discussed their complaints with Sir Charles Bruce-Gardner,
the president of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, and was persuaded
that the chief diﬃculty arose from the Air Ministry requiring minor changes to be
made to aircraft under production. In April he advised Chamberlain that there
was mounting criticism of the Air Ministry in parliament and press, and in May
the secretary of state for air, Lord Swinton, who could not defend his ministry in
the House of Commons, resigned.29 Meanwhile, the cabinet had authorized the
Air Ministry to accept as many aircraft as the aircraft industry could produce, up
to a maximum of 12,000 machines over the next two ﬁnancial years, with a
Treasury oﬃcial sitting on a new Air Council Committee on Supply with full
ﬁnancial authority to approve expenditure on buildings and plant as well as air-
craft. As a result, the gap between British and German aircraft production began
to close and in September 1939 British output overtook Germany’s.30 Even so,
when, after the Munich crisis, the Air Ministry sought approval of a greatly
increased expansion programme, Wilson advised that it was very unlikely that
Britain could match German production without putting the aircraft industry and
its suppliers on a war footing. Any announcement to that eﬀect, he thought,
would be taken by the Germans as a sign that the British government had decided
to sabotage the Munich declaration, signed by Chamberlain and Hitler, that
disagreements between the two countries would be resolved peacefully, and
Hitler would denounce the Anglo-German naval treaty of 1935 and also accel-
erate his own air rearmament.31 Chamberlain hoped to follow upMunich with an
agreement on arms limitation, and the cabinet directed the Air Ministry to give
priority to ﬁghter production, while limiting orders for bombers to what was
necessary to ensure that factories and labour were not idle.32
Following the German occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939, increasing
numbers of patriotic Britons came forward to join the Territorial Army (TA). On
28 March Chamberlain was due to speak to the 1922 Committee of the
Conservative party in the evening and he wished to say something about reports
that volunteers were being turned away because the units in which they wished to
enlist were up to establishment. Wilson discussed the matter with the secretary of
state for war, Leslie Hore-Belisha, who wished to introduce conscription. Wilson
told him that was out of the question, on account of trade union opposition. As an
alternative, Hore-Belisha suggested doubling the TA by duplicating every unit.
Wilson liked the idea and undertook to explain the position to senior Treasury
oﬃcials, after which Chamberlain authorized him to discuss the matter with
the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir John Simon, with a view to enabling
29 Wilson to prime minister, 15 Mar. 1938, and note by Wilson for prime minister, n.d. but c. 22
Apr. 1938, PREM 1/236, fos. 211–12 and 126–9.
30 G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 156–8.
31 Wilson to J. H. E. Woods, principal private secretary to the chancellor of the exchequer,
1 Nov. 1938, PREM 1/236, fos. 72–74.
32 CC 51 (38) and 53 (38), 31 Oct. and 7 Nov. 1938, CAB 23/96.
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Chamberlain to make an announcement the next day.33 Senior Treasury oﬃcials
were dismissive of Hore-Belisha’s proposal, pointing out that it was unrelated to
any strategic plan, that the immediate military value of the enlarged TA would be
nil, and that the eﬀect of the announcement would be likely to make Hitler think
that he should strike at once. The Foreign Oﬃce, however, supported the
measure as a means of impressing Europe with Britain’s military determination,
and Simon agreed with the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, that this aspect out-
weighed ﬁnancial considerations.34
Wilson approached foreign policy from the perspective of his wide-ranging role
at 10 Downing Street : for him the economy, rearmament, and appeasement were
interconnected. For example, in the recession of 1938 he hoped that progress in
talks with Germany and Italy would lead to a considerable revival of business
conﬁdence, which had been aﬀected by war talk.35 He also saw the easing of the
labour shortage in the recession as a reason why there was no need to introduce
controls over industry or labour to expedite rearmament.36 Wilson was also
Chamberlain’s conﬁdant in political matters. For example, in April 1939 the
prime minister discussed with him the pros and cons of bringing Churchill into
the government.37 Wilson’s activities on Chamberlain’s behalf included news
management: he saw press proprietors to enlist support for appeasement, and
warned the BBC to exercise self-censorship.38 Wilson’s relationship with the
Foreign Oﬃce is part of a broad picture of his role as the person who was called
upon to give advice on, and act as the prime minister’s agent in, any matter in
which Chamberlain was interested.
I I
In his memoirs, Eden recalled how in May 1937 Fisher and Wilson had a con-
versation with his recently appointed parliamentary private secretary, Thomas,
during which they criticized Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary
at the Foreign Oﬃce, for being an alarmist and for hampering all attempts
to establish friendly contacts with Germany and Italy. They wanted Thomas to
create a better understanding between the Foreign Oﬃce and 10 Downing Street
by countering Vansittart’s inﬂuence.39 Eden failed to mention that he was himself
33 Memorandum by Wilson, 29 Mar. 1939, PREM 1/296, fos. 32–7; R. J. Minney, The private papers
of Hore-Belisha (London, 1960), pp. 186–8.
34 Memorandum by J. A. N. Barlow, 28 Mar. 1939, T 175/104 (part 2) ; CC 15 (39), 29 Mar. 1939,
CAB 23/98.
35 Wilson to Sir James Grigg, 31 Jan. 1938, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, PJGG
2/23/2(a).
36 Shay, British rearmament, pp. 247–8.
37 Chamberlain to Hilda, 15 Apr. 1939, in R. Self, ed., The Neville Chamberlain diary letters, IV
(Aldershot, 2005), p. 407.
38 R. Cockett, Twilight of truth : Chamberlain, appeasement and the manipulation of the press (London, 1989),
pp. 15, 110, and 119.
39 Earl of Avon, The Eden memoirs : facing the dictators (London, 1962), pp. 447–8.
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anxious to be rid of Vansittart, to whom he had oﬀered the Paris embassy in the
autumn of 1936. In the event, Vansittart was replaced by Sir Alec Cadogan on 1
January 1938 and given a new post of chief diplomatic adviser, and largely side-
lined from mainstream policy-making. Whereas Cadogan and Wilson were
regularly in attendance at meetings of the cabinet’s Foreign Policy Committee,
Vansittart was usually absent. In his memoirs, Vansittart described Chamberlain
as ‘spellbound’ by Wilson, and said that neither man understood his passionate
warnings of the threat posed by the dictator states.40
Cadogan’s diary shows that he liked but did not quite trust Wilson, and felt that
Wilson’s interference in Foreign Oﬃce aﬀairs wanted watching.41 There is evi-
dence that Cadogan had reason for being on his guard. The Italian ambassador,
Count Grandi, established contact with Wilson through Sir Joseph Ball, the di-
rector of the Conservative Research Department. Ball later denied that he or
Wilson were used by Chamberlain as agents to go behind the back of the Foreign
Oﬃce, but Ball’s former association with MI5 may have made him economical
with the truth.42 There was also the curious case of the M15 report in November
1938 that George Steward, the press spokesman at 10 Downing Street, had told
the press attache´ at the German embassy, Fritz Hesse, on 11 October that the
Foreign Oﬃce was so anti-German that it should be by-passed in future nego-
tiations between Chamberlain and Germany. Chamberlain denied knowledge
of the approach and said that he could not believe Wilson had been behind
it – prompting Cadogan to note in his diary ‘nor can I, quite ’.43 Oliver Harvey,
who was private secretary ﬁrst to Eden and then to Eden’s successor, Halifax,
thought that Wilson did not always keep Cadogan in the picture concerning 10
Downing Street’s handling of the press.44 It was Wilson who took the initiative in
having the head of the Foreign Oﬃce’s Press Department, Reginald Leeper,
transferred abroad. According to Leeper, who was opposed to the policy of ap-
peasement, he was summoned after Munich by Wilson, who told him that some
members of the Foreign Oﬃce had said that he (Leeper) was not loyal to the
government and that if that was the impression he gave he was not suitable for the
work.45 Cadogan thought that there was some justiﬁcation for 10 Downing
Street’s complaints about Leeper’s handling of the press.46
Wilson corresponded privately with Sir Nevile Henderson, the ambassador in
Berlin, and Sir Eric Phipps, the ambassador in Paris. Cadogan felt he had ‘to
40 Lord Vansittart, The mist procession (London, 1958), pp. 442–3.
41 D. Dilks, ed., Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (London, 1971), 5 and 10 Jan. and 3 Mar.
1938, pp. 32, 34, and 57.
42 I. Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (London, 1961), pp. 216–17, 218–19; note of conversation with
Sir Joseph Ball, 26 Jan. 1949, Templewood papers, XIX, ﬁle 5.
43 Documents on German foreign policy 1918–1945, series D, vol. 4 (DGFP D/4), doc. 251; Cadogan diary,
1 Dec. 1938, ACAD 1/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
44 J. Harvey, ed., Diplomatic diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937–1940 (London, 1970), 10 and 13 Mar. 1939,
pp. 260–1. 45 Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (London, 1965), pp. 424–5.
46 Cadogan to Halifax, 28 Nov. 1938, Foreign Oﬃce papers, series 800, vol. 396 (FO 800/396),
TNA.
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manoeuvre against ’ Wilson.47 Nevertheless, he kept in close touch with him on
foreign policy and believed that Wilson took him into his conﬁdence. The two
men often met to discuss matters, but did not normally communicate in writ-
ing48 – which makes it diﬃcult for the historian to know whether Wilson kept
Cadogan fully informed about initiatives from 10 Downing Street. According to
Wilson, everything that he learned and made known to the prime minister was
also made known to Cadogan, and it was sheer nonsense to suggest that Number
10 ignored the Foreign Oﬃce.49 Wilson’s marginal notes on documents in the
Prime Minister’s Oﬃce ﬁles to the eﬀect that Halifax and Cadogan had been
informed of their contents support this claim.
Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials were naturally critical of Wilson acting independently
of, and often, they believed, at variance with, the oﬃcial machinery of govern-
ment.50 Halifax took a diﬀerent view. His experience was that Wilson was ex-
tremely helpful in ensuring that the prime minister and foreign secretary were
fully acquainted with each other’s thought.51 Moreover, Wilson did not have a
monopoly of advice to the prime minister. During the Czech crisis, for example,
Chamberlain regularly consulted an inner cabinet of Halifax, Simon, and Sir
Samuel Hoare, the home secretary (both Simon and Hoare being former foreign
secretaries), in addition to less frequent meetings of the full cabinet. This inner
cabinet had three oﬃcial advisers : Cadogan, Vansittart, and Wilson.52 Cadogan’s
importance, in particular, should not be overlooked: he was close enough to
Chamberlain to penetrate the latter’s notoriously reserved manner and developed
a great respect and aﬀection for the prime minister, even when he did not agree
with his policies.53 Cadogan thought that Wilson was out of his depth in foreign
aﬀairs but decided to make the best of him, recognizing that Chamberlain had
complete conﬁdence in him.54 While there was rivalry between the Foreign Oﬃce
and Wilson, there was also co-operation.
Wilson’s initial diﬀerences with the Foreign Oﬃce concerned Italy rather than
Germany. According to Thomas, Wilson believed that it was Chamberlain’s
mission to break down the hostility of Germany and Italy towards Britain, and
that Mussolini was particularly hostile towards Eden, on account of the economic
sanctions that had been applied through the League of Nations during the Italo-
Abyssinian war.55 Eden for his part was deeply suspicious of Mussolini’s inter-
vention in the Spanish Civil War and his intentions in the Middle East. When in
July 1937 the Italian ambassador requested a meeting with Chamberlain, the
Foreign Oﬃce prepared a brief drawing attention to Italian troop movements
47 Cadogan diaries, 29 June 1939, p. 190.
48 Cadogan to Martin Gilbert, 4 Feb. 1962, ACAD 4/5.
49 Wilson, ‘Munich 1938’, CAB 127/158, p. 16. 50 Gladwyn, Memoirs, p. 76.
51 Earl of Halifax, Fulness of days (London, 1957), p. 231.
52 Viscount Templewood, Nine troubled years (London, 1954), p. 301.
53 Cadogan to the earl of Birkenhead, 20 Jan. 1965, Cadogan papers, ACAD 4/4.
54 Note of conversation with Cadogan, 14 Nov. 1951, Templewood papers, XIX, ﬁle 5; Cadogan
diaries, p. 53. 55 Avon papers, AP 7/24/81.
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posing a threat to Egypt. Wilson commented on the brief : ‘ this is not my idea of a
genial conversation – it suggests an undercurrent of annoyance which, even if we
feel it, should not be displayed tomorrow’.56 Chamberlain wrote a personal letter
to Mussolini in Grandi’s presence on 27 July. According to Thomas, Wilson made
sure it was sent without Eden having a chance to comment on it, because Wilson
knew that, had the Foreign Oﬃce seen the letter ﬁrst, it would not have been
sent.57 Chamberlain believed that the Foreign Oﬃce was inclined to be jealous,
and in Eden’s case that may well have been true, as he had ﬁrst put forward to
Chamberlain the idea of a personal letter. However, whereas Eden had thought
that the letter should be written by him, as foreign secretary, Wilson suggested it
be written by the prime minister.58
Wilson’s papers contain a letter, dated 28 October 1937, from a former
permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Oﬃce, Lord Tyrell, enclosing an
anonymous note from someone described as a mutual friend of Tyrell and
Leeper. The note alleged that Eden’s ‘personal prejudices ’ were an obstacle to
good Anglo-Italian relations and suggested that Chamberlain’s knowledge of
Grandi’s willingness to co-operate in creating a better atmosphere provided a
chance ‘ to put Eden ‘‘on trial ’’ to clear up the past ’. If he could not, the note
added, it would be diﬃcult to see how the prime minister could continue to
support his foreign secretary.59 Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials were not united on how
Italy should be approached: even Leeper was impressed by Wilson’s criticism of
the Foreign Oﬃce’s ‘negative policy ’, and, supported by Sir Orme Sargent,
urged Eden to recognize Italy’s empire in Abyssinia and to enter negotiations
without waiting for an agreement over Spain. On the other hand, other
oﬃcials agreed with Eden that Britain should not appear to be running after
Mussolini.60
The issue of how to deal with Mussolini had not been resolved when a fresh
dispute arose between Chamberlain and Eden over how to respond to a message
to the prime minister on 12 January 1938 from President Roosevelt. Roosevelt
wanted approval within ﬁve days of a plan devised by the American under sec-
retary of state, Sumner Welles, for international agreement on principles to be
observed in relations between nations ; arms limitation; and equal access to raw
materials. The message came at a time when there had been tentative contacts
between Washington and London in response to Japanese aggression in the Far
East, and, although Cadogan regarded the president’s ideas as ‘wild ’, he thought
that it was important not to snub him. Consequently, while agreeing with Wilson
that Roosevelt’s initiative would delay a bilateral approach by Britain to Italy,
56 Wilson to prime minister, 26 July 1937, PREM 1/276, fo. 346.
57 Avon papers, AP 7/24/81. Chamberlain’s letter is reprinted in Documents on British foreign policy,
2nd series, vol. 19 (DBFP 2/19), doc. 65. 58 D. Carlton, Anthony Eden (London, 1981), pp. 107–8.
59 Tyrell to Wilson, 28 Oct. 1937, with enclosure dated 27 Oct., T 273/410. Tyrell was permanent
under-secretary, 1925–8, and ambassador in Paris, 1928–34.
60 Harvey diaries, 7 Nov. 1937, p. 57. Sargent was the assistant under-secretary of state who supervised
the work of the Foreign Oﬃce’s department dealing with Gemany.
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and that the president should be asked to hold his hand, Cadogan included in
a draft reply a sentence to the eﬀect that, if Roosevelt wished to go ahead,
Britain would support him. However, he was unable to persuade Chamberlain
and Wilson to agree to include this sentence, and Chamberlain did not consult
with Eden, who was in France, before sending a polite reply asking Roosevelt to
defer his plan for a while.61 Eden told Chamberlain on 16 January that he
resented the lack of consultation and the next day Wilson called on the foreign
secretary. He warned Eden that the prime minister was much disturbed by
their diﬀerence of opinion, and asked for a more understanding attitude on
Eden’s part towards the dictators. According to Eden, writing twenty-ﬁve years
after the event, the conversation ended with him telling Wilson that if ever he
(Eden) became prime minister and wished advice on an industrial problem,
he would send for Wilson, but that Wilson did not understand foreign aﬀairs.62
On 19 January Wilson admitted to Thomas that there was a fundamental dif-
ference between Chamberlain and Eden in their outlook on foreign policy and
seemed prepared for a break.63 However, on the following day, after Eden had
argued his case through four meetings of the Foreign Policy Committee,
Chamberlain gave way and agreed to the despatch of a telegram asking
Roosevelt to go ahead with his plan after all.64 By then the president was less
certain that he wished to proceed, perhaps because his own secretary of state,
Cordell Hull, had always thought that the plan was ‘ illogical and impossible ’,
and it was at ﬁrst postponed and then dropped.65 It is worth noting, however,
that it had been the Foreign Oﬃce’s advice, and not Wilson’s, that had pre-
vailed.
Disagreement on how to achieve an Anglo-Italian rapprochement continued.
On 17 February Wilson was called to the House of Commons about 11 p.m.
to ﬁnd the prime minister dejected about a letter from Eden expressing doubt
about whether anything could be done to improve relations with Mussolini.
The next morning Wilson made suggestions to Chamberlain for a compromise
with Eden, but Chamberlain had decided to insist on the immediate opening of
conversations with Italy. A meeting between Chamberlain, Eden, and Grandi
on 18 February, and weekend meetings of the cabinet on the 19th and 20th,
conﬁrmed the gulf between prime minister and foreign secretary, and Eden re-
signed. Wilson later wrote that Eden seemed to agree with Chamberlain about
the objectives of foreign policy, but did not want to do much to secure them.
61 Cadogan diaries, 12 and 13 Jan. 1938, p. 36; DBFP 2/19, doc. 430. For context and consequences of
this aspect of diﬀerences between Chamberlain and Eden see G. Bennett, ‘The Roosevelt peace plan
of January 1938’, FCO Historical Branch Occasional Papers, no. 1 (Nov. 1987), pp. 27–38.
62 Avon, Facing the dictators, pp. 553–6.
63 Avon papers, AP 7/24/81; Harvey diaries, 20 Jan. 1938, p. 75.
64 DBFP 2/19, doc. 455. 65 Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948), I, p. 547.
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In Wilson’s eyes, Eden’s ‘vacillation’ made a break inevitable ; as he told
Chamberlain’s widow, ‘I always shared Neville’s opinion about his deﬁ-
ciencies ’.66
I I I
Wilson’s inﬂuence on foreign policy was reﬂected in the way in which he acted
as an unoﬃcial channel through which Chamberlain’s ideas reached Germany.
On 10 March 1938, two days before Hitler ordered his troops into Austria, Wilson
told Theodor Kordt, the counsellor at the German embassy in London, that the
prime minister had been pleased to learn that, in conversation with Lord Lothian,
Hitler had compared England and Germany to two pillars upon which the
European social order could rest. Wilson thought that an arch of co-operation
should be erected on these two pillars, and he hoped that Germany would suc-
ceed in her aims in regard to Czechoslovakia and Austria as much as possible
without the use of force.67 Wilson took his cue from Chamberlain’s belief that
Hitler intended to absorb only German-speaking areas into the Reich, while
reducing the rump of Czechoslovakia to dependent neutrality ; that Britain was in
no position to make war on Germany, and that the diplomatic problem was to
ﬁnd a peaceful solution which would absolve France of her treaty obligation to
come to the Czechs’ assistance.68 In a conversation in June with an oﬃcial of the
German Ministry of Economics, Helmut Wohlthat, Wilson gave the impression
that the British government was prepared to recognize Germany’s predominant
economic position in central Europe and to accept the transfer of the
Sudetenland to Germany, if Hitler would state what the limits to the territorial
expansion of Germany would be.69 On 23 August Wilson told Kordt that, if there
was a possibility of a peaceful solution, the British government would be prepared
to enter serious negotiations on Czechoslovakia as a beginning to further talks on
the whole ﬁeld of Anglo-German relations. He added that Bolshevism would
be the only gainer from war.70
On 31 August Halifax sent Wilson a letter from Churchill which advocated a
joint declaration by Britain, France, and Russia of their interest in a peaceful
solution, with a statement that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia ‘would raise
capital issues for all three powers ’. Wilson advised Chamberlain that the inclusion
of Russia would infuriate Hitler, robbing the declaration of any value it might
have as a means of persuasion. He questioned whether Britain, France, or Russia
were in a position to make a threat, and warned that a commitment to taking
action would very likely result in Britain attacking Germany for all practical
66 Wilson, ‘Munich 1938’, CAB 127/158; Wilson to Anne Chamberlain, 5 Apr. 1944, Neville
Chamberlain papers, NC 11/1/616, Special Collections, University of Birmingham.
67 DGFP D/1, doc. 148.
68 Foreign Policy Committee minutes, FP (36) 26, 18 Mar. 1938, CAB 27/623.
69 DGFP D/2, doc. 279. 70 Ibid., doc. 382.
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purposes single-handed.71 Wilson was concerned with what he called the ‘ frig-
idity ’ of Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials towards Germany.72 On 1 September he dis-
cussed with Vansittart, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, the deputy under-secretary of state,
and Sargent a draft for a speech that Halifax wanted to make on Czechoslovakia.
In Wilson’s view the draft, containing passages such as the British people ‘might
be swept to stern action’ and ‘we need not fear war’, amounted to a threat to
Germany, such as he believed the Foreign Oﬃce had wanted to make since
March, but which a meeting of ministers had rejected only two days before.
Halifax agreed to omit the oﬀending paragraphs.73
Five days later Kordt came again to 10 Downing Street, this time in secret as a
delegate of a German military and political group who wished to prevent war.
Kordt had already, on 23 August, told Wilson that the British government must
speak and act clearly. Now he warned him that Hitler was planning to invade
Czechoslovakia on 19 or 20 September on the assumption that France would not
fulﬁl her treaty obligation. Kordt urged Wilson that Chamberlain should broad-
cast to the German nation an unequivocal statement of Britain’s determination to
help the Czechs resist an attack, claiming that a diplomatic defeat for Hitler was a
prerequisite for German army leaders to act against the Nazi regime. Wilson was
suﬃciently impressed by what Kordt had to say to ask him to come again the next
day to repeat it to Halifax and Cadogan. Cadogan thought that a broadcast such
as Kordt advocated would be fatal to the chances of a peaceful settlement.74
Halifax agreed ; instead, Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials discussed with Wilson the idea
that the ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, should convey a private warning that
Britain could not stand by if France were involved in hostilities and in danger of
being defeated. Wilson’s view was that speeches already made by ministers would
have made Hitler aware that that was the position, and that he might resent
anything Henderson said as a threat.75
Meanwhile in late August Chamberlain and Wilson had devised a plan, Plan
Z, whereby the prime minister would be prepared to ﬂy to Germany to meet
Hitler. On 30 August Chamberlain explained the plan to Henderson, so that he
could assist in its execution, but the only ministers who knew about it at that stage
were Halifax and Simon. According to Wilson, its success would depend on it
being a complete surprise, and it was vital that there should be no leakage.76
Cadogan and Vansittart were only told on 8 September. Vansittart compared the
plan with the Emperor Henry IV’s humiliation before the pope at Canossa, and
71 Churchill to Halifax and Wilson to prime minister, both 31 Aug. 1938, PREM 1/265, fos. 117–22.
72 Wilson to prime minister, 12 July 1938, PREM 1/330, fo. 63.
73 Wilson to prime minister, 1 Sept. 1938, and MSS message for Sir H. Wilson, PREM 1/265, fos.
89–94; meeting of ministers, 30 Aug. 1938, CAB 23/94.
74 Cadogan diaries, 6 and 7 Sept. 1936, pp. 94–5; P. Hoﬀmann, The history of the German resistance,
1933–1945 (London, 1977), pp. 66–7.
75 Wilson to Chamberlain, 5 Sept. 1938, PREM 1/265, fos. 61–6.
76 Note by Wilson, 30 Aug. 1938, PREM 1/266A, fo. 363; Chamberlain to Ida, 3 Sept. 1938,
Chamberlain diary letters, p. 342.
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wanted a warning sent to Hitler before he made a speech at Nuremberg on the
12th. Cadogan disagreed with Vansittart on both points.77 Nevertheless, on the
9th, on Halifax’s insistence, a note of warning to Hitler was sent to Henderson to
deliver. On receiving the note on the 10th Henderson immediately wrote to
Wilson that Hitler was on the borderline of madness and that the warning would
push him over the edge and drive him to greater violence or menaces. Henderson
said he had conveyed the substance of the note in conversations with the German
foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and other leading Nazis, and ministers
decided he need not convey it to Hitler, a decision with which Cadogan agreed.78
Hitler’s speech on the 12th did not entirely close the door to a peaceful settlement
and late in the evening of the 13th the four ministers agreed that Plan Z should be
put into operation.
As early as 10 September Wilson had been sending Cadogan ‘some ﬁrst
thoughts ’ on points that the prime minister might raise with Hitler. The ﬁrst was
that the Czech government (pressed by the British ‘ independent ’ mediator, Lord
Runciman) had gone far enough to meet the Sudeten-Germans’ claims to provide
a hopeful basis for negotiations, and there was no case for the use of force. The
second was that the purpose of Chamberlain’s foreign policy was to bring about
such an improvement in the European situation as to remove the raison d’eˆtre of
Czechoslovakia’s treaties with France and Russia. In this connection Wilson
suggested that the prime minister should say that he fully appreciated Hitler’s
view that Germany and Britain formed two pillars supporting orderly civilization
against Bolshevism, and that nothing should be done to weaken resistance to this
threat. The third point was that Germany was a natural trading partner for the
countries of south-east Europe and, provided that Germany pursued an ‘open
door ’ policy whereby Britain had access to these markets, and Germany did not
interfere politically or militarily in these countries, Britain would be ready to
make available credit to facilitate an increase in international trade.79 Wilson
accompanied Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden on 15 September but the Foreign
Oﬃce was represented only by William Strang, the head of its Central
Department, which dealt with Germany, and Henderson. In conversation with
Hitler, Chamberlain went further than Wilson’s brief on the Sudeten-Germans’
claims by ‘personally ’ recognizing the principle of detachment from
Czechoslovakia, subject to approval by his cabinet colleagues. On Wilson’s se-
cond point, Chamberlain did ask Hitler if German concerns about
Czechoslovakia would be removed by the ending the Czechs’ alliance with
Russia. The conversation did not reach Wilson’s third point on trade.80
On the 16th, Wilson had separate conversations with Germans who were at
Berchtesgaden: Herbert von Dirksen, the ambassador to Britain; Ernst von
77 Cadogan diaries, 8 Sept. 1938, pp. 95–6.
78 DBFP 3/2, doc. 815, and appendix I, pp. 649–50; note of meeting, 10 Sept. 1938, PREM 1/266A,
fos. 339–40; Cadogan diaries, 10 Sept. 1938, p. 96. 79 PREM 1/266A, fos. 344–8.
80 DGFP D/2, doc. 487; CC 39(38), 17 Sept. 1938, CAB 23/95.
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Weizsa¨cker, state secretary of the German Foreign Ministry ; Walter Hewel, chief
of Ribbentrop’s personal staﬀ ; and Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter. All four
spoke of the favourable impression that Chamberlain had made on Hitler. Only
Ribbentrop himself, with whom Wilson had lunch, failed to praise the prime
minister, an omission Wilson put down to Ribbentrop’s ungenerous character.
Chamberlain was much taken by Wilson’s report of the conversations, keeping a
personal copy and repeating in a letter to his sisters Hewel’s words that Hitler had
said that he had had a conversation with a man.81 In short, Wilson’s gullibility
enabled the Germans to play upon Chamberlain’s vanity. In contrast, when
Hewel made similar remarks to Ivone Kirkpatrick, ﬁrst secretary of the British
embassy in Berlin, on 24 September, Kirkpatrick knew they were ‘bunkum’ and
said so to Hewel.82 Unfortunately no one seems to have said as much to
Chamberlain and, at Munich, the prime minister retained the illusion that he had
established a relationship of mutual conﬁdence and trust with Hitler.
Chamberlain met his inner cabinet of Halifax, Hoare, and Simon in the
evening of the 16th, with Cadogan, Vansittart and Wilson present. Runciman
joined them to report that it had not been possible to ﬁnd a solution to the
Sudeten problem that would satisfy Germany. The next day the full cabinet
accepted the principle of self-determination for the Sudeten-Germans as a basis
for negotiations, although concern was expressed that it might lead to the dis-
memberment of Czechoslovakia.83 While ministers were meeting, Wilson had
what seems to have been a full and frank discussion with Fisher, who believed that
Chamberlain had ‘sold the fort ’ at Berchtesgaden. The permanent secretary of
the Treasury warned that, by appearing to surrender to force and agreeing to the
disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Britain was in danger of being seen by world
opinion as Germany’s partner in crime. Any plebiscite, he urged, must be a real
one, preceded by German demobilization, supervised by an international police
force, and taken only after the inhabitants of the areas concerned had had time
in which to cool down. Wilson agreed that a plebiscite must be conducted in
a proper manner and that it would be desirable if the Americans could be
persuaded to contribute to the supervisory police force. However, he noted,
perhaps with some exasperation: ‘ I still do not get from anyone any clear advice
as to what we should do in present circumstances as the alternative to agreeing to
the application of the principle of self-determination. ’84 In the event, when
French ministers visited London on 18 September, Edouard Daladier, the
premier, objected to a plebiscite, on the grounds that the Germans might exploit
81 ‘The prime minister’s visit to Germany’, notes by Wilson, 16 Sept. 1938, Neville Chamberlain
papers NC 8/26/2; Chamberlain diary letters, 19 Sept. 1938, p. 348.
82 I. Kirkpatrick, The inner circle (London, 1959), pp. 121–2.
83 CC 39 (38), 17 Sept. 1938, CAB 23/95.
84 Fisher to Wilson, 17 Sept. 1938, LSE\Coll Misc 461, British Library of Political and Economic
Science, London School of Economics; Wilson to prime minister, 17 Sept. 1938, and Wilson to Fisher
(not sent), 18 Sept. 1938, T 273/405. For Fisher’s attitude to Germany see G. C. Peden, ‘Sir Warren
Fisher and British rearmament against Germany’, English Historical Review, 94 (1979), pp. 29–47.
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the principle of self-determination elsewhere, including Alsace, and fromWilson’s
notes it appears to have been in deference to the French that the alternative was
adopted of transferring areas with a majority of Sudeten-German inhabitants
without plebiscite.85
After two days of intense Anglo-French pressure, the Czech government
agreed to an Anglo-French plan for the transfer of territory in an orderly way,
and Chamberlain, accompanied by Wilson, Strang, and Sir William Malkin of
the Foreign Oﬃce’s legal department, ﬂew back to Germany, where he met
Hitler at Godesberg on 22 September. Henderson and Kirkpatrick from the
Berlin embassy completed the British team. Hitler rejected Chamberlain’s pro-
posals and, on the 23rd, handed the prime minister a memorandum setting out
Germany’s terms for the military occupation of the Sudetenland on 1 October.86
Chamberlain faced the choice of rejecting Hitler’s demands and threatening war
if Czechoslovakia were invaded, or trying to persuade his cabinet colleagues and
the French and Czech governments to accept Hitler’s demands. He probably did
not need Wilson’s advice to choose the latter course : as he told the cabinet on the
24th, he believed Hitler was telling the truth when he said that he aimed at the
racial unity of Germany and not the domination of Europe.87 Halifax took a
diﬀerent view. Unlike the prime minister, he believed that Hitler did aim at
supremacy in Europe. In this, the foreign secretary seems to have been inﬂuenced
by a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) report, dated 18 September, which listed
German objectives as including the reduction of the countries of central and
south-eastern Europe, and later Belgium, Holland, the Baltic States, and
Scandinavia to vassal status, and the break up of the Soviet Union into auton-
omous states, some of which would also be German vassals. Even so, the SIS
report saw no alternative to a peaceful transfer of the Sudeten-German areas to
forestall the inevitable. At ﬁrst Halifax agreed, but, following a discussion with
Cadogan late on the 24th, he told the cabinet on the 25th that his position was
changing. He now felt that the Godesberg terms involved a diﬀerence in principle
from the Anglo-French plan and said that if the Czechs rejected them, and if
France went to war in fulﬁlment of her treaty obligations, Britain should join in
too. The cabinet agreed that the Czechs should not be pressed to accept the
Godesberg terms.88
By the time the cabinet resumed its discussion at 11.30 p.m. on the 25th,
Chamberlain had learned that the Czech government had decided to reject the
terms, and he had met Daladier and the French foreign secretary, Georges
Bonnet, who had been evasive as to what action France would take in the event of
a German invasion of the Sudetenland. Chamberlain was able to secure cabinet
85 DBFP 3/2, doc. 928, p. 381, and doc. 937, p. 405; Wilson to prime minister, 18 Sept. 1938, PREM
1/266A, fo. 272.
86 DBFP 3/2, docs. 1033, 1068, and 1073. 87 CC 42 (38), 24 Sept. 1938, CAB 23/95.
88 ‘What should we do’, 18 Sept. 1938, FO 371/21659; Cadogan diaries, 25 Sept. 1938, p. 105;
CC 43(38), CAB 23/95.
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support for his proposal that Wilson should take a letter from him to Berlin,
asking Hitler to make concessions to enable an orderly transfer of territory to take
place. If Hitler refused to respond to this appeal, Wilson was authorized to give
him a personal message from the prime minister to the eﬀect that if France went
to war, it seemed certain that Britain would be drawn in.89 Meanwhile Henderson
had phoned Weizsa¨cker earlier in the evening to tell him to disregard any British
statements not coming from Chamberlain himself, adding that Chamberlain’s
position was diﬃcult and British policy should not be upset by false moves.90
Parker believed that this phone call must have been inspired by Wilson, in an
attempt to nullify the Foreign Oﬃce and unreliable ministers, including Halifax.91
The prime minister and foreign secretary certainly placed very diﬀerent empha-
ses on conciliation and coercion. The cabinet minutes make clear that
Chamberlain did not want his appeal to Hitler to be accompanied by anything
that looked like a threat, but on the 26th Halifax, without consulting the prime
minister, agreed to issue a statement drafted by Leeper to the eﬀect that the
German claim to the transfer of the Sudeten-German areas had already been
conceded, but if Czechoslovakia were attacked, France was bound to come to her
assistance, ‘and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France’.92
Accompanied by Henderson and Kirkpatrick, Wilson read Chamberlain’s
letter to Hitler on the 26th while the fu¨hrer was in a state of excitement prior to
making a speech later in the evening. After the second paragraph, which said that
the Czechs rejected the Godesberg terms, had been translated, Hitler rose to leave
the room, and it was only with diﬃculty that Wilson persuaded him to hear out
Chamberlain’s proposal for direct negotiations between the Germans and
Czechs, facilitated, if both sides wished, by a British representative. Hitler made
clear that there could be no question of negotiations with the Czechs to modify
the Godesberg terms, only discussions on how to implement them, and de-
manded acceptance by the Czechs within two days. Wilson judged the moment
was not right to deliver the oral warning he had been told to give and asked for a
further meeting the next day.93 In a telegram to Chamberlain on the 26th, Wilson
said that, unless Hitler left a loophole in his speech, ‘ I presume we should deliver
message in suitable terms and come away. ’94 In the event, Hitler’s speech was not
as violent as expected: although he committed himself to 1 October for the date
for the military occupation of the Sudetenland, he also oﬀered to guarantee what
was left of Czechoslovakia once the claims of the Poles and Hungarians to its
territory had been satisﬁed. Wilson advised Chamberlain that it was ‘very
doubtful whether it is either necessary or wise ’ to deliver the warning. However,
Chamberlain replied that the message must be delivered ‘ in view of what we have
said to the French’, but it ‘ should be given more in sorrow than in anger ’.95
89 CC 44 (38), CAB 23/95.
90 DGFP, D/2, doc. 610. 91 Parker, Chamberlain and appeasement, p. 174.
92 DBFP 3/2, p. 550n. 93 Ibid., docs. 1097, 1118. 94 Ibid., doc. 1116.
95 Message from Wilson, 26 Sept. 1938, PREM 1/266A, fos. 76–7; DBFP 3/2, doc. 1121.
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Wilson was faithful to his role as his political master’s voice when he met Hitler
on the 27th, even trying to speak in what he said was the tone which Chamberlain
would have used had he been present. Echoing his brief for the prime minister
prior to the talks at Berchtesgaden, Wilson prefaced Chamberlain’s message by
referring to the advantages of an Anglo-German economic agreement and to
Hitler’s description of Britain and Germany as bulwarks against the forces of
destruction, particularly from the east. He also drew attention to the particular
form of words that Chamberlain used: if in fulﬁlment of treaty obligations to
Czechoslovakia French forces ‘became actively engaged in hostilities against
Germany’, the British government would feel obliged to support France. When
Hitler said that this meant that if France attacked Germany Britain would too,
Wilson replied that it was not known how the French intended to carry out their
treaty obligation, and that a way to avoid war must be found. Hitler said the only
way was for the Czechs to give way and, according to the German account,
Wilson told him he would ‘ try to make those Czechos sensible ’.96
On his return to London later on the 27th Wilson reported ﬁrst to the inner
cabinet and then to the full cabinet. He said it was clear that Hitler was convinced
that the Czech premier, Eduard Benesˇ was ‘a twister ’ who would continue to
prevaricate ; the Germans had tapped phone messages from Jan Masaryk, the
Czech minister in London, to Benesˇ urging him not to cede territory since ‘ they
had got France and Great Britain exactly where they wanted’. Wilson advised
that, assuming the Czech government would ﬁnd Hitler’s terms too humiliating
to accept, the only way for it to prevent the country being overrun would be for it
to withdraw its troops and allow the Germans to occupy the Sudetenland without
loss of life. A plebiscite could then be carried out by an international commission.
The Czechs would have the assurance of Hitler’s public declaration that the
Sudetenland represented his last territorial aim in Europe, and a Franco-British
guarantee (to which the cabinet had agreed on the 19th) of their independence ;
the alternative was that the Germans would occupy a much more extensive area
than the Sudetenland. He had drafted a telegram along these lines to be sent to
Prague. Chamberlain said he did not propose that the Czech government should
be advised to take this course, but merely that the suggestion should be put to
them. Halifax commented that the suggestion amounted to complete capitulation
and the cabinet agreed that the telegram should not be sent.97
Wilson has been much criticized for his handling of the warning to Hitler. Duﬀ
Cooper, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty, thought it had been delivered with so
many additional clauses that it lost its force. There is evidence for this point of
view: as Reynolds notes, Hitler ordered the units that would spearhead the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia to move to their assembly areas shortly after Wilson’s
second interview with him. Keith Robbins thinks that Wilson was intellectually
96 DGFP, D/2, doc. 634. According to Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The appeasers (London,
1963), p. 167, Wilson said the word he used was Tschechen, the German for Czechs.
97 CC 46 (38), 27 Sept. 1938; Cadogan diaries, 27 Sept. 1938, p. 107.
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defeated by Hitler, who made it seem absurd that the question of peace or war
should be left to the Czechs, or that Britain should attack Germany because of a
disagreement over the manner in which the Sudetenland should be transferred.
Niall Ferguson describes Wilson as a ‘ feeble emissary ’ who could not cope with
Hitler’s histrionics.98 On the other hand, Strang thought that, from a professional
point of view, no serious fault could be found in Wilson as a negotiator, although
he was not qualiﬁed to advise on foreign policy.99 Scott Newton suggests that
Chamberlain and Wilson can be seen as pursuing an essentially Cobdenite
project of improving Anglo-German relations by holding out the prospect of
economic agreement to the advantage of both countries once the Sudeten-
German question was resolved.100 From this point of view, Wilson’s diplomacy
was eﬀective in letting the Germans know precisely what Chamberlain’s views –
as opposed to those of the cabinet or Foreign Oﬃce – were. Hitler responded to
the warning by sending a letter in the evening of the 27th oﬀering to guarantee
what would be left of Czechoslovakia after the transfer of territory.101
The next morning, following the announcement of the mobilization of the
British ﬂeet, Wilson saw Ribbentrop’s representative in London, Hesse, and told
him that, while the British government was willing to agree to the substance of the
Godesberg terms, it was impossible for any democratic government to advise the
Czechs to accept the demand for military occupation. If the Germans were to
give way on the form of the transfer, the British government would be prepared to
press acceptance on the French and Czechs, but if Hitler could not be dissuaded,
Britain would declare war, as public opinion was convinced that the principles of
democratic freedom were at stake. The report of this conversation left London at
10.40 a.m., three hours and twenty minutes before the time that Hitler had set for
Czech acceptance of the Godesberg terms.102 This further warning by Wilson
seems to have had some eﬀect. At 11.30 the Foreign Oﬃce sent a message from
the prime minister to Berlin saying he was willing to come to Germany at once to
discuss arrangements for the transfer of the Sudentenland with Hitler and re-
presentatives of the Czech and, if Hitler agreed, the French and Italian govern-
ments. That afternoon Chamberlain was able to tell the House of Commons that
he had accepted Hitler’s invitation to him, Daladier, and Mussolini (but not the
Czechs) to a conference at Munich the next day.
At the Munich conference Wilson was again Chamberlain’s principal adviser,
Strang, Malkin, and Henderson being the most senior Foreign Oﬃce re-
presentatives. However, although diplomacy was in the prime minister’s hands,
he had to win modiﬁcations in the Godesberg terms to make them acceptable to
the cabinet. Consequently on the ﬂight home on 30 September, Wilson asked
98 Duﬀ Cooper, Old men forget (London, 1954), p. 239; Reynolds, Summits, p. 78; K. Robbins, Munich
1938 (London, 1968), p. 301; N. Ferguson, The war of the world (London, 2006), pp. 358–9.
99 Lord Strang, Home and abroad (London, 1956), pp. 126–7.
100 S. Newton, Proﬁts of peace (Oxford, 1996), p. 85.
101 DBFP 3/2, doc. 1144; Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945: nemesis (London, 2000), p. 118.
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Strang to draw up a list of the ways in which the Munich agreement was an
improvement, from the Czech point of view, from the Godesberg terms. Strang
recalled that the list was longer than might have been expected, but that in
substance the changes proved to be worthless. The main diﬀerence was that the
transfer of territory would take place over ten days rather than on 1 October.103
Wilson’s contemporary defence of Munich can be found in the notes he pre-
pared for the speech Chamberlain was due to make on 3 October in the House of
Commons. Wilson’s detestation of war went beyond the common fear of air
attack. He remarked that critics who said Chamberlain should have stood up to
Hitler hardly ever employed phrases which recognized that their alternative
might involve ‘mutilation and murder and indescribable suﬀering to millions
of people … in many countries, including, it may be, our own’. Yet, he added,
‘unless the calculation is that a bold declaration would be a successful bluﬀ, the
alternative policy mustmean either that if the bluﬀ was called we should at once be
involved in war, or else that we should have to … withdraw our bold words with
the maximum of ignominy’. Regarding claims that matters would have turned
out better if Hitler had been warned earlier that an invasion of Czechoslovakia
would bring Britain as well as France into war, Wilson said it was clear from the
conversations at Berchtesgaden that Hitler knew the risk and was prepared to go
ahead (a statement that begs the question of why it had been necessary for Wilson
to deliver a warning to Hitler on 27 September).104 In the event, Chamberlain
chose not to use any of Wilson’s material. Simon, however, did follow some of
Wilson’s notes when speaking in parliament on 5 October regarding grounds for
hope. First, Hitler had made concessions although it was (Wilson believed) very
diﬃcult for the head of a totalitarian state to do so. Second, Hitler now realized
that the German people had no enthusiasm for war, and ‘even in Germany
public opinion can inﬂuence policy in times of real emergency’. Third, the prime
minister was popular in Germany as a peacemaker and had made contact with
the fu¨hrer as no democratic statesman had previously done. Fourth, the British
people had been roused as never before to the danger of war, and no policy,
however conciliatory, could succeed unless it was supported, in the last resort, by
a brave and determined people with adequate means to enforce it.105
I V
In the aftermath of Munich there was considerable discussion in Whitehall about
the future direction of British policy. As noted above (p. 989) Wilson wrote on
1 November that putting the aircraft industry on a war footing would be contrary
to the Munich declaration that Anglo-German disagreements would be settled
103 Strang, Home and abroad, p. 148. For diﬀerences between Godesberg memorandum and Munich
agreement see Chamberlain’s speech on 3 Oct. 1938, 339 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th
ser., 1937–8, cols. 42–45.
104 Notes signed and amended by Wilson, n.d., T 273/407.
105 The relevant passage of Simon’s speech is at 339 HC Deb, 5th ser, cols. 347–8.
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peacefully. MI5’s contribution to the debate was a report on 7 November that
implicitly criticized Chamberlain’s failure to respond to intelligence about the
extent and Machiavellian nature of Hitler’s plans, and which stated that Munich
had convinced the German leader that Britain was decadent and lacked the will
and power to defend its empire. To ensure that Chamberlain took notice of the
report, MI5 included examples of Hitler’s insulting references to him.106
Chamberlain nevertheless clung to his hopes that Hitler would give a sign that he
was prepared to contribute to the ‘general paciﬁcation of the world ’.107
Wilson tried to sustain the policy of appeasement despite growing Anglo-
German antagonism. Public horror at the violence of Kristallnacht, when Jewish
property was attacked by organized Nazi mobs in November 1938, increased the
diﬃculties associated with proposals for the restoration of German colonies,
which Chamberlain had contemplated since 1936 as part of a full, ﬁnal, and
comprehensive settlement with Germany. The possibility of retrocession aroused
opposition in ex-German colonies and the colonial secretary, Malcolm
MacDonald, who was due to make a statement in parliament on 7 December,
asked the prime minister for guidance. Wilson and Cadogan worked on the
Colonial Oﬃce’s draft statement and agreed that, while nothing could be done
about the colonial question at present on account of recent events in Germany –
Wilson commented that ‘ these ought not to be mentioned’ – the wording of
the statement should avoid any ﬁnality, advice with which Chamberlain con-
curred.108
By late January 1939, the Foreign Policy Committee, with Wilson present, was
concerned about intelligence reports of possible hostile action by Germany
against Britain, and Halifax commented that the recent dismissal of Hjalmar
Schacht as president of the Reichsbank supported the theory that Germany’s
economic and ﬁnancial condition was becoming desperate and forcing Hitler
towards mad adventures.109 Nevertheless, Wilson, writing to Phipps in Paris, re-
marked on 2 February that the consistency and persistence of the prime minister’s
policy were steadily enhancing Britain’s position. Wilson had sent an advance
copy of a ‘ﬁrm, matter-of-fact ’ speech by Chamberlain to Hitler and believed
that it had encouraged restraint by Hitler in his speech on 30 January. Like
Chamberlain, Wilson believed that, while there should be no relaxation in re-
armament, appeasement was best served by keeping the political temperature
low.110
Wilson held to this view of how to handle the dictators even after the German
occupation of Prague on 15 March. On 19 March, when drafting an appeal to
Mussolini to use his inﬂuence to restrain Hitler, Cadogan wanted to include a
106 C. Andrew, The defence of the realm: the authorized history of MI5 (London, 2009), pp. 203–6.
107 Chamberlain wondered whether Hitler’s New Year speech containing these words was such a
sign, but was advised by Cadogan that it was not – note by Strang, 5 Jan. 1939, FO 371/22988, fo. 39.
108 PREM 1/247, fos. 2–7. 109 FP (36) 35, 23 Jan. 1939, CAB 27/624.
110 Sir Eric Phipps papers, PHPP 3/5, fo. 47, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
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warning about Mussolini’s recent threats against France, but Wilson thought this
would destroy the hoped-for good eﬀects of the letter, and that the subject of
Franco-Italian relations was better left to Lord Perth, the ambassador in Rome.
Chamberlain agreed that the warning would be ‘out of place ’, and the ﬁnal draft
contained only a hint of a warning.111 Cadogan had the better understanding of
the fascist mentality : Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, noted on
23 March that Chamberlain’s letter was ‘another proof of the inertia of the
democracies ’.112
Chamberlain himself told the cabinet on 18 March that he had come to the
conclusion that it was no longer possible to negotiate with Hitler on the old basis,
since no reliance could be placed on any of his assurances.113 By the next day, he
had come up with the idea of a declaration by the British, French, Polish, and
Russian governments that they would consult together in the event of any threat
to the independence or security of any European state, but Poland refused to
alienate Germany by publicly associating with Russia.114 An alternative way of
maintaining Polish independence had not been found when Ian Colvin, the
Berlin correspondent of the News Chronicle, arrived in London claiming Germany
would attack Poland very soon unless it was clear Britain would go to war. Halifax
took him to see Chamberlain on 29 March and the prime minister agreed to the
idea of an immediate declaration of support for Poland.115 Wilson pointed out to
the Foreign Policy Committee the next day that inquiries by the War Oﬃce
indicated little, if any, sign of the concentration of German troops against the
Polish frontier, and Chamberlain agreed that this information did not support the
theory that Germany was contemplating a coup de main.116 Nevertheless, the prime
minister was persuaded by Halifax to announce a guarantee of Polish indepen-
dence on 31 March. Chamberlain believed he had retained room for manoeuvre,
in that Britain was committed to defend the independence rather than the
boundaries of Poland, but Wilson thought that the commitment was a mistake
and thus found himself for the ﬁrst time in serious disagreement with the prime
minister. Wilson recognized that some ‘ﬁrming-up’ of policy was inevitable after
Prague, but he shared Henderson’s fears that Polish intransigence would drag
Britain into war over Danzig.117
Nevertheless, Wilson was too good a civil servant to allow disagreement to alter
his relations with the prime minister. Chamberlain turned to Wilson in May
when pressed by parliamentary critics, the Foreign Oﬃce, and the majority of the
cabinet to agree to negotiations for a three-power alliance with France and
111 Cadogan to Wilson, 19 Mar. 1939, and Wilson to prime minister, PREM 1/327, fos. 30–8;
Cadogan diaries, 20 Mar. 1939, p. 162.
112 M. Muggeridge, ed., Ciano’s diary, 1939–1943 (London, 1947), p. 54.
113 CC 12 (39), CAB 23/98.
114 Chamberlain diary letters, 19 and 26 Mar. 1939, pp. 394 and 396.
115 Colvin, Vansittart, pp. 303–10. 116 FP (36) 39, 30 Mar. 1939, CAB 27/624.
117 Chamberlain diary letters, n.d., p. 401 ; Wilson to Henderson, 12 May 1939, PREM 1/331A, fo. 75 ;
Gilbert, ‘Horace Wilson’, pp. 8–9.
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Russia. By Chamberlain’s account, during their discussion, an idea emerged
whereby an alliance could be avoided. The three powers would declare their
intentions in certain circumstances to fulﬁl their obligations under article 16 of the
covenant of the League of Nations, which included military as well as economic
sanctions against an aggressor. Chamberlain believed that article 16 would at
some future date be amended or repealed, giving Britain a chance to revise her
relations with Russia.118 Donald Watt attributes the idea to Wilson and describes
it as a ‘poisonously stupid and criminally asinine piece of ingenuity ’, but also
notes that Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials do not seem to have understood its implications
when they prepared a draft for the British ambassador in Moscow to present
to the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov.119 Responsibility for the
proposal would seem to be shared by the Foreign Oﬃce. Moreover, Molotov’s
objection to it was based not on the reference to article 16 but to British unwill-
ingness to impose guarantees on the Baltic States against their will.120 On
7 June Cadogan and Wilson drafted a statement for the prime minister which
made clear that Britain and France were ready to give Russia full military
support without delay if she were attacked by a European power.121 There is
no evidence in relation to negotiations for a three-power alliance that Wilson
diminished the inﬂuence of the Foreign Oﬃce, most of whose senior oﬃcials
had doubts about Russia’s military capability and her intentions towards her
neighbours.122
On the other hand, it has been argued that Wilson’s informal contacts with
Germany in the last months of peace undermined the eﬀorts of those in the
Foreign Oﬃce who were opposed to appeasement and wanted Hitler to be in no
doubt that Britain would ﬁght if Poland were invaded.123 Wilson met Wohlthat,
the German trade commissioner, on 6 June and 18 July ; Herbert von Dirksen, the
ambassador, on 3 August ; and Hesse, on 20 August. Harvey and Jebb, who were
respectively private secretaries to Halifax and Cadogan, recorded that the
Foreign Oﬃce learned of the Wilson–Wohlthat talks in July only when rumours
of a peace oﬀer to Germany appeared in the press.124 However, it is less than
certain that Halifax and Cadogan were kept in ignorance, since Harvey and Jebb
were not present when the permanent under-secretary had his frequent but un-
recorded meetings with Wilson. Nor did Halifax and Cadogan always see ﬁt to let
the rest of the Foreign Oﬃce know what they knew. For example, Lord Kemsley,
the newspaper proprietor had a conversation with Wilson before making a pri-
vate visit to Germany. Cadogan knew about the visit but other oﬃcials were kept
in the dark to prevent the Foreign Oﬃce Press Department leaking the story to the
118 Chamberlain diary letters, 28 May 1939, p. 418.
119 D. C. Watt, How war came (London, 1989), p. 247. 120 DBFP 3/5, docs. 665, 670.
121 Cadogan diaries, p. 186.
122 See K. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the collapse of the Versailles order, 1919–1939 (Cambridge,
2006), pp. 278–9, 282–3, 284–5, 315–16.
123 Parker, Chamberlain and appeasement, pp. 263–5; Watt, How war came, pp. 406–7.
124 Harvey diaries, 23 July 1939, p. 303; Gladwyn, Memoirs, p. 93.
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press.125 The case for Wilson diminishing the Foreign Oﬃce’s inﬂuence cannot be
securely based on lack of oﬃcial communication between 10 Downing Street and
the Foreign Oﬃce.
An alternative approach would be to show that the message that Wilson was
communicating to the Germans was at odds with that which the Foreign Oﬃce
wished to convey. There are problems with the evidence as to what was said in
Wilson’s conversations with Wohlthat and von Dirksen. Wohlthat was an oﬃcial
in the German ministry of economics, which was headed by Hermann Go¨ring,
who did not want war with Britain. Wohlthat therefore misrepresented what was
said in his conversations with Wilson in order to persuade Hitler of the case for
peace. Von Dirksen similarly attributed views to Wilson that were really his
own.126 According to Wilson, he told Wohlthat at their meeting on 6 June
that Germany was disturbing the peace of Europe. At their meeting on 18 July,
according to Wohlthat, Wilson gave him a memorandum proposing an Anglo-
German non-aggression pact, recognition of the two countries’ respective econ-
omic interests, and a reopening of the colonial question. Wilson’s notes, however,
record only that he gave Wohlthat a copy of The Times of 30 June containing a
speech by Halifax which repeated the prime minister’s view that there was an
opportunity for Anglo-German co-operation once Germany ceased to disturb the
peace of Europe. On the other hand, Wohlthat’s report that Wilson had suggested
that an Anglo-German declaration renouncing forcible aggression would make
Britain’s guarantees to Poland and Rumania superﬂuous is supported by Wilson’s
account of a later conversation with von Dirksen (see below). Even so, Wilson was
not unduly paciﬁc. He ended the conversation on 18 July with a warning : when
Wohlthat said that the fu¨hrer did not wish to become involved in war, Wilson
replied that he was not surprised, since Hitler could not have overlooked the
tremendous increases that Britain had made in its defensive and oﬀensive pre-
parations, especially the air force, and was unlikely to take the risk of becoming
involved in a quarrel. Wohlthat’s report noted that Wilson had said that there
should be no false impression as to British determination to ﬁght if necessary.127
The nature of Wilson’s contacts with Wohlthat was widely misunderstood
as a result of a one-hour conversation on 20 July between Wohlthat and Robert
Hudson, the junior minister at the Department of Overseas Trade, who put
forward ideas about Anglo-German economic co-operation. Hudson mentioned
the conversation to journalists, and Chamberlain was far from pleased to read
newspaper reports that Germany was being oﬀered a British loan to enable
Germany to halt rearmament and convert its industry to a sound commercial
basis. Whatever Hudson may have said to have started such a rumour,
Wohlthat’s version of Wilson’s ideas states only that ‘ it would be possible within
the framework of German-British co-operation to ﬁnance the reorganisation
of British and German industry ’ to avoid unemployment arising from the
125 Watt, How war came, p. 406. 126 Ibid., pp. 395–400, 402–3.
127 DGFP, D/6, doc. 716; DBFP 3/6, doc. 354.
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changeover from production of armaments to civil goods. According to Wilson,
the only loan he had talked about with Wohlthat was the one which the Czech
government had raised in London after Munich and which had been among the
Czech assets frozen by the Treasury after the German occupation of Prague.
Wilson would seem to have been non-committal about the loan since Wohlthat
did not refer to it in his account of the conversation.128
The next German to call on Wilson was von Dirksen, who claimed that
Wohlthat’s report on his conversations in London had aroused considerable in-
terest in Berlin, but went on to say that Britain’s continuing policy of encircle-
ment, as shown by her talks with Poland and Russia, created a lack of conﬁdence.
Wilson replied that all British commitments were entirely defensive and once
the German government made clear that there would be no further aggression
‘ the policy of guarantees to potential victims ipso facto became inoperative ’.
Wilson also pointed out that it was impossible for the British government to enter
general discussions on Anglo-German relations until public opinion felt circum-
stances had changed. He suggested that Hitler should reduce the military threat
to Poland, exercise patience over Danzig, set up some form of autonomy for
Bohemia and Moravia, and announce he was ready to give a lead in Europe
designed to substitute harmony and security for the present state of friction and
apprehension. Wilson added that it was useless to follow up Wohlthat’s ideas for
economic co-operation if German troops were marching up and down the Polish
frontier. Wilson showed his note on the conversation to Chamberlain and
Halifax, who took the view that the approach represented by Wohlthat and von
Dirksen should be kept alive, if the Germans wished, by discussing with them an
agenda for talks on a general settlement.129 Ribbentrop, however, did not wish to
pursue an initiative that had originated with Go¨ring. On 20 August Hesse told
Wilson that the reports by Wohlthat and von Dirksen had made a favourable
impression in Berlin, but dismissed Wohlthat as an economist who was out of his
depth in political diplomacy. Hesse delivered orally a message from Ribbentrop
which made three points : ﬁrst, the Danzig question should be left to the Germans
and Poles to settle ; second, once that was done, Hitler would be prepared to oﬀer
Britain an alliance ; third, refusal of this oﬀer would mean a ﬁght to the ﬁnish
between the two countries. Wilson simply noted what Hesse had to say and
passed on the message to Chamberlain, Halifax, and Cadogan.130
On 22 August, the cabinet agreed that the news that Germany and Russia
were about to sign a non-aggression pact would not change British policy towards
Poland, and a personal letter from Chamberlain to that eﬀect was dispatched to
Hitler. Hitler’s response was along the same lines as Ribbentrop’s message to
Wilson. On 26 August Wilson and Butler produced a draft reply to Hitler which
128 Chamberlain diary letters, 23 July 1939, p. 430–1; DGFP, D/6, doc. 716, p. 982; Harvey diaries, 23 July
1939, p. 303.
129 DBFP 3/6, doc. 533, and Wilson’s note, 4 Aug. 1939, PREM 1/330, fo. 1.
130 Note by Wilson, 20 Aug. 1939, PREM 1/331A, fos. 152–9.
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was criticized in cabinet as being ‘ somewhat too deferential ’ and was replaced by a
ﬁrmer one by Cadogan.131 Harvey thought that Wilson and Butler were ‘working
like beavers ’ for another ‘Munich’ at which the Poles could be sold out.132
However, even Cadogan shared Wilson’s hopes for a compromise over Danzig.133
Wilson believed in late August that Hitler would not move at once and was en-
couraged by intelligence reports of German generals asking whether the Axis with
Italy had broken up (following Italian pressure on Hitler to accept direct nego-
tiations with the Poles) and of people in Germany having no illusion that a war
would be short.134 He showed no weakness when Go¨ring’s intermediary,
the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus, phoned him from the British
embassy in Berlin on 31 August with German terms for a friendly settlement with
Britain : a German voice could be heard repeating Dahlerus’s words, and when
Dahlerus said that the Poles were obstructing everything, Wilson put down the
receiver.135 Wilson’s ﬁnal contact with the Germans came in the evening of 2
September, the day after the invasion of Poland began, and after Chamberlain
had stated in parliament that if Germany withdrew her forces the way would
be open for a German–Polish settlement and an international guarantee. Hesse
phonedWilson with an invitation fromRibbentrop to come to Germany to discuss
the whole position. Wilson was not tempted to repeat his experience in September
1938: he simply referred to the prime minister’s statement and said that Britain
could not agree to any conversations until the status quo had been restored.136
There is little evidence that Wilson undermined the eﬀorts of the Foreign Oﬃce
in 1939. He was a channel through which informal contact could be made between
Chamberlain and Germany, and was seen as such by the Germans. On the
other hand, Wilson was always careful not to commit the prime minister to any
initiative. There was certainly a diﬀerence of style between Wilson’s approach to
diplomacy and Cadogan’s (and even more so Vansittart’s) : Wilson’s faith that
dictators would respond well to genial approaches from Britain was unfounded,
and Cadogan had consistently to make any draft by Wilson ﬁrmer. However,
there was nothing in what Wilson said to the Germans in 1939 to encourage Hitler
to believe that Britain would not ﬁght if he invaded Poland.
V
After Chamberlain died in November 1940, Wilson made it his business to defend
his late political master’s reputation. In October 1941, while still permanent
131 CC 43(39), 26 Aug. 1939, CAB 23/100. The drafting by Wilson and Butler is in PREM 1/331A,
fos. 449–67. Cadogan’s draft is in DBFP, 3/7, doc. 426.
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secretary of the Treasury, and therefore with access to oﬃcial papers, he pro-
duced a sixty-page memorandum on Munich, which was clearly intended as a
note for the record.137 He was also active in 1941 in helping the Chamberlain
family to recruit a biographer, making inquiries into G. M. Young’s ‘outlook’,
and deciding that he was unsuitable, before recommending Keith Feiling, whom
he found ‘most sympathetic ’.138 Feiling insisted on being free to write the truth as
he saw it, and in his book he dismissed Wilson’s advice to the prime minister on
foreign policy as ‘amateur ’. Even so, a comparison of his Life of Neville Chamberlain
(1946) and Young’s distinctly unsympathetic biography of Baldwin, which ap-
peared in 1952, suggests that the Chamberlain family had been well advised by
Wilson. Feiling refused to be inﬂuenced by hindsight and produced what was
for long the standard defence of Chamberlain as a man of integrity who was
aware that on his decision rested the fate of a generation and of the British
empire.139
Meanwhile Lord Maugham, who had been lord chancellor in Chamberlain’s
government, published The truth about the Munich crisis (1944), and Wilson arranged
for copies to be sent to people whom he hoped would be ‘wiser ’ as a result of
reading it.140 The historiographical tide was ﬂowing against appeasement, how-
ever, and never stronger than in 1948, when the ﬁrst volume of Churchill’s
History of the Second World War appeared, with its claim that British foreign policy
had been weakened by the National Government’s failure to take his advice to
accelerate rearmament and to form a grand alliance with Russia.141 Wilson
helped Hoare with a review of the book, suggesting that Churchill glossed over
the eﬀects on British policy of the military, economic, and political weakness of
France.142 Wilson was determined not to publish anything himself, but he gave
Hoare notes on the case to be made for appeasement when the latter was writing
his book, Nine troubled years.143 Subsequently Wilson answered inquiries from
other writers on the period, including Sir Evelyn Wrench, who was writing a
biography of Geoﬀrey Dawson, the editor of The Times who was associated
with appeasement, and Ian Colvin, who was using Vansittart’s papers to claim
that Chamberlain had ignored warnings about where his foreign policy would
lead.144 Wilson’s willingness to engage with Chamberlain’s critics was shown
by the way that he spoke at length with two young historians, Martin Gilbert
137 CAB 127/158.
138 Wilson to Anne Chamberlain, 21 May, 11 June, and 27 July 1941, NC 11/15/124–6.
139 K. Feiling, The life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), p. 327; G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin
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and Richard Gott, while they were working on their book, The appeasers (1963),
and he subsequently corresponded with Gilbert, providing much of the
material for the latter’s History Today article. Gilbert and Gott restated the ‘Guilty
Men’ thesis, but by the time Paul Addison interviewed him in 1967 Wilson
believed with some reason that opinion was changing in the light of historical
research.145
Following the release of government records under the thirty-year rule in-
troduced by the 1968 Public Records Act, revisionist historians showed that
Chamberlain had been constrained by domestic political, economic, and mili-
tary factors as well as diplomatic circumstances. However, Parker made a
powerful post-revisionist case in 1993 when he argued that, while Chamberlain’s
options were restricted by circumstances, he chose appeasement whenever he
had a choice.146 Wilson’s defence of Chamberlain was necessarily directed
against the ‘Guilty Men’ view of appeasement, and did not directly address the
post-revisionist interpretation. Like revisionist historians, Wilson pointed out
that Chamberlain had to take account of domestic political and economic
factors as well as international circumstances.147 According to Wilson,
Chamberlain’s goals were ﬁrst, the maintenance of peace and second, rearma-
ment to ensure that Britain would be treated with respect by other countries.
Chamberlain believed that the ﬁrst goal required a more active policy of ap-
peasement than had been pursued down to 1937, but he was also aware that
Britain had started late in the armaments race and wished to gain time to be
ready for war if it came. Wilson thought that all political parties must accept
some of the blame for defence deﬁciencies, but he attributed the late start to the
Labour and Liberal opposition’s paciﬁsm. Chamberlain inherited from Baldwin
a commitment not to introduce conscription and felt that it would be possible to
depart from this pledge only when events brought home the peril faced by the
nation, as was the case by April 1939 when conscription was introduced for
the ﬁrst time in peace. Almost as an afterthought Wilson remarked that ‘perhaps
the Conservative Party ought to have embarked upon a crusade after 1935 to
convince the country that the danger demanded immediate rearmament ’, but
added that ‘openly throwing over the League of Nations ’ would have been
‘received very unfavourably by large sections of public opinion’, including the
Labour movement. He thought that Churchill’s proposal in 1936 that industry
should be put on a war footing would have encountered many practical diﬃ-
culties and that its eﬃcacy in increasing production of munitions was ‘a matter
145 For shift in academic opinion about this time see D. C. Watt, ‘Appeasement : the rise of a
revisionist school? ’, Political Quarterly, 36 (1965), pp. 191–213.
146 Parker, Chamberlain and appeasement. The clearest statement of the revisionist case is D. Dilks,
‘ ‘‘We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst. ’’ The prime minister, the cabinet and Hitler’s
Germany, 1937–1939’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 73 (1987), pp. 309–52.
147 What follows is based mainly on Wilson’s memorandum ‘Munich 1938’, Oct. 1941, CAB 127/
158, and Hoare’s notes from conversations with Wilson, 5 Mar. 1947 and 27 May 1948, Templewood
papers, XIX, ﬁle 5, and correspondence with Wilson, March–July 1952, ibid., XIX, ﬁle 12.
W I L S O N A ND A P P E A S EM E N T 1011
of speculation ’. In contrast, Wilson’s Treasury colleague, Sir Frederick Phillips,
thought in 1940, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, that failure to put industry on a
war basis in 1936 had been an error, large rearmament orders producing
nothing for a year or more on account of bottlenecks.148 Wilson did admit that
steps should have been taken before 1938 to prepare the way for changes in
industrial practices to allow unskilled men to do skilled men’s work, but he
doubted whether the trade unions would have been receptive to the idea. The
attitude of the key Amalgamated Engineering Union down to the summer of
1939 to attempts to economize on the use of skilled labour suggests that in this
respect Wilson was correct.149
In his analysis of the international situation Wilson highlighted the isolation of
America, the weakness of France, and the determination of Russia to be tertius
gaudens (that is the third party who would take what advantage it could from
disputes between other powers). Wilson believed that Chamberlain was right
to suspect that Russia wanted war between Britain and Germany as the only
bulwarks against Communism, and that nothing that happened in 1939–40 sug-
gested otherwise. Regarding Munich’s critics, he pointed out that Churchill
had the freedom of not being in oﬃce, and not therefore having to attempt to
implement his ideas for an alliance with Russia. Wilson confessed to not being
able to understand Vansittart who, while permanent under-secretary of the
Foreign Oﬃce, had tried to keep Italy friendly and had believed that it was worth
trying to appease Germany. However, Vansittart had also urged acceleration
of rearmament in 1936, on the grounds that the only argument that Germany
believed in was force.150
Regarding Munich, Wilson was certain that any help given by France to
Czechoslovakia would have been half-hearted, a view that receives support from
France’s inaction while Poland was overrun in 1939. Wilson noted that, in 1938,
Chamberlain faced the prospect of war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, knowing
that Britain’s air defences and civil defence preparations were incomplete. Wilson
recalled telling Baldwin after Munich how unsatisfactory it was to have to put up
with what had happened, but that any time after spring 1939 Britain would be
able to say ‘no’ to Germany, and that in September 1939 Chamberlain did say
‘no’. Wilson never claimed, however, as two American political scientists have
done recently, that appeasement was a strategy to buy time for rearmament.151 As
he told Gilbert, the aim of appeasement was not just to postpone war; rather it
was an attempt to avoid war altogether by seeking agreement with all European
148 Phillips to Wilson, 20 June 1940, T 177/56.
149 R. A. C. Parker, ‘British rearmament, 1936–1939: Treasury, trade unions and skilled labour’,
English Historical Review, 96 (1981), pp. 306–43.
150 Wilson appeared to be referring to the views expressed by Vansittart, in ‘The world situation
and British rearmament ’, Dec. 1936, DBFP 2/17, appendix II.
151 N. M. Ripsman and J. S. Levy, ‘Wishful thinking or buying time? The logic of British ap-
peasement in the 1930s’, International Security, 33 (2008), pp. 148–81.
1012 G. C. P E D E N
powers, including Germany.152 But, Wilson argued, Chamberlain was not naı¨ve
at Munich: there was nothing unreasonable in uniting all Germans in one
country, although Hitler’s methods were obnoxious, and it was not until later
that Hitler tried to dominate the world. Wilson said that Chamberlain was aware
that his policy might fail, but if it did the British people and the world would know
that Germany was responsible for the war. Wilson recorded that two days before
he died Chamberlain still thought that there had been no alternative. Wilson
likewise never changed his mind. As two Treasury oﬃcials who knew him well
told the author, so great was his conﬁdence in his own intellectual processes he
could not conceive that he could have been wrong on any issue, even Munich.153
V I
To conclude, Wilson was much more than an obedient civil servant carrying out
the prime minister’s instructions. On the other hand, even Foreign Oﬃce critics
did not think he went beyond the bounds of what was proper for a civil servant,
although they thought he should have realized that he was being asked by the
prime minister to do things which were outside his competence.154 Regarding
Wilson’s inﬂuence on foreign policy, when there was outright disagreement be-
tween him and the Foreign Oﬃce, as with his advice to the cabinet in September
1938 that the Czechs should accept the Godesberg terms, or the guarantee to
Poland in March 1939, it was the Foreign Oﬃce that prevailed. The image of
Wilson as an e´minence grise determining foreign policy is very much overdrawn.
Indeed, there is much to be said for David Dilks’s view that in all probability
British foreign policy would have been essentially the same if Wilson had never set
foot in Downing Street.155 However, this is not the same as saying that Wilson was
of no importance. His role as Chamberlain’s conﬁdant sustained the prime
minister. Wilson’s execution of his political master’s wishes enabled Chamberlain
to have greater control of foreign policy than would otherwise have been the case.
Even so, Chamberlain did not have a free hand; although he was adept at
managing his cabinet, he could not override it.
This study of Wilson’s role has sought to dispel some long-established myths.
However, both Wilson’s advice to Chamberlain and his unrepentant defence of
appeasement after the latter’s death broadly conﬁrm Parker’s post-revisionist
interpretation of appeasement. Even had Britain been better prepared for war in
1938, Wilson would not have favoured combining with France and, especially,
Russia to prevent Hitler incorporating German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia
into the Reich. On the other hand, in June 1939 Wilson ﬁnally accepted the need
152 Gilbert, ‘Horace Wilson’, p. 6.
153 Conversation with Sir Thomas and Lady Padmore, 15 Mar. 1975. My notes have been deposited
in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
154 Gladwyn, Memoirs, p. 76; Strang, Home and abroad, pp. 126–7.
155 D. N. Dilks, ‘The British Foreign Oﬃce between the wars’, in Opinion publique et politique exte´rieure,
1915–1940, Collection de l’E´cole Franc¸aise de Rome, 54/2 (Rome, 1984), pp. 165–86, at p. 183.
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for a Russian alliance. He persisted in hoping that the dictator powers could be
won over by the prospect of economic collaboration, but in his informal contacts
with Germans in the summer of 1939 he was a good deal ﬁrmer regarding
Britain’s will to ﬁght if necessary than his critics then and later allowed. In all
these respects he faithfully reﬂected, and no doubt reinforced, Chamberlain’s
views.
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